"Russian artillery ineffective?" Topic

The most obviously different thing about the Russian army of the era compared to others was the large battery size; typically, 12 or 14 guns where all the other nations had only 6 or 8.

The guns per 1,000 men ratio among Russian armies was often quite high. At Eylau it was around 6, Borodino over 5, and so on. More typical ratios for other armies seem to have been in the 2.5 to 3.5 range.

Despite this, I've hardly ever read of Russian artillery being noticeably devastating in battle. You'd think that an army with 6 guns per thousand men would inflict more losses than one with 2.5, but it doesn't seem to apply. Battles against Russian armies don't generally seem to have been noticeably bloodier for the French than any others. When they were, it's usually better explained by the tactics, terrain or circumstances than by the number of guns.

Can anyone shed any light on this? Was Russian artillery not very good, or did they hold it back in reserve, provide less ammunition, observe some other doctrine, or what?

It seems to be a historical feature of Russian armies in many eras that they have hordes of guns.

I think there was something about the quality of powder they used which reduced their effectiveness.

Beside, Napoleonic guns were about their usage, not their size or number. The French excelled at getting the guns to where they were needed, others did not. hence, the French wanted more manoeverable batteries, while others relies on bigger heavier guns.

the grand battery thing confuses the actual usage – G-B's were used very specifically for a single aim, not as a standard tactic.

More guns doesn't necessarily imply effectiveness.

Napoleon's most successful victories are marked by his lowest guns per 1000 ratio & as he amassed more guns, his victories grew more bloody & less clear cut.

The doctrine/use was the problem. The counting of Tubes means little in war, it is who and how they where being used.

However, I am not sure you are correct in your assumption. I am sure that when the guns where massed they did mange to annoy the French some what. Take a look at Eylau, and Borodino. Also some of the 1813 Battles there where a lot of Russian Cannon balls killing French and their allies.

It was really about getting the guns to the battle field, if I recall correctly in the earlier periods of the Wars the guns whould not march with the infantry but in their own columns. This hampered the Russian in the 1807 campaign, with a couple of exceptions. Also in 1807 all the light batteries ie 6pdrs where used as battlion guns which diluted there impact as always seemed to be the case when battlion guns where used.
William

All makes sense.

What puzzles me is that while there are a few battles where the Russkis had a high ratio, there were others where the number of guns was relatively normal.

This would mean they had relatively few actual batteries to go round relative to the number of guns – i.e. if a French and Russian force each had 56 guns in play, that's 7 French but only 4 Russian batteries.

This would have had a tactical impact, in that the French artillery could be in 7 places on the battlefield but the Russian in only 4. So presumably they either split batteries up tactically now ana again, or they didn't because they always used them en masse.

The former would defeat whatever the object of large individual batteries was, and the latter would imply frequent episodes of artillery carnage. While the latter did happen, they don't seem to have been the rule.

I think you also missing the "doctrine" of an artillery park, this can be seen in a number of battles and seems to have been used often by the Russians. This means that they will have less guns on the Front.

You have to look at lots of battles, as over 20 some years of conflict there are huge variations on the use and effectiveness of thier guns.

This is probably the best place to start for information on the Russians, TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS
By Alexander & Yurii Zhmodikov

You can get it at Nafziger site.

link
William

I've read from respected sources that the Russian artillery arm was not highly regarded in Russia. It tended to get officers who couldn't afford to do anything else, or simply didn't have the aptitude. Powder quality was an issue as stated and although the men were steadfast and brave they lacked the kind of leadership and training other armies enjoyed.

Doctrinally they always had a large reserve of artillery which sometimes backfired on them. At Borodino for example something like 100 guns never saw action from the reserve because the general commanding them decided to lead a bayonet charge and was never seen again. Lacking the designated leadership and initiative they played no significant part in the battle.

I don't buy the powder issue for anything other then perhaps long range accuracy, over 800 Meters firing at a specific target.

I am pretty confident if you put a Prussian, French, British, Russian or Austrian battery of 6pdrs (or the equivalent) firing at enemy at engagement range of under 600 meters I am not sure you going to see a great difference.

Where differences lies is how and when the guns placed and used on the field of Battle. Command ability, knowing what to point the tubes at, Doctrine and experience would be the determining factors and no amount of the fabled bad Russian powder would do much to change that.
William

Oh no, not the Russian powder myth again……..

The true answer is doctrine. russian artillery was not used as agressively as say the French or British field artillery.

Russian organisation & ordnance from 1812 was excellent; the guns were the most modern in europe, with good weight of shot at both 6 and 12 pds for main cannon. The 12 gun batteries weretn always used as 12 guns. The 12 guns included 4 licornes, which were a cross between a howitzer and a cannon. Probably not excellent at either!

but the licrones were often stripped from the battery, and grouped together in reserve giving 8 guns per battery. A field battery and the position battery might also join them. there was always a hefty artillery park for the Russians, and it didnt always get used wisely (or at all!!).

Russians typically had ( post 1812) 2 medium bttys and 1 heavy per division. the heavy btty would be put into the Reserve, or a redobut. The medium guns would be spread along the whole frontage of the brigades to boost firepower throughout. this was a defensive doctrine, with ammunition etc very localised and not massed ammo reserves, nor was it as easy to replenish when laid out before the brigades – so a lower rate of fire might be assumed, and then only when actually attacked.

It therefore didnt have the singular "punch" that the French gave their artillery firing by concentrating the guns in a particular part of the field. It was a tactical use arm, not grand-tactical.

A further complication for russian infantry is the artillery doctrine of never wishing to lose a gun. Russian guns would limber up and retire rather than put them at risk – just when they were needed most by the infantry lines behind.

All of this makes Russians appear less effective in the field, despite being man for man a good and modern arm of service. The chances are though, that the mass deployment of Russian artillery among the brigades is one reason why Russians would be able fight a deadly battle and yet still live to fight anohter day in a way that e.g. Prussia and Austria could not.

Happy to be corrected on the Russian powder thing, I'd only ever heard it in discussion, never read it in print.

This is another area of mythology – the Russians made a mess of Augereau's Corps at Eylau. We are hearing yet again about the agressive tactics of the French, yet it is a claim born only of Senrmont's claims at Friedland (amnesia about infantry right behind him) and N's Grand battery at Wagram, which filled a gap, which had opened in his flank, but which was static and guarded by Guard infantry. Smola's bombardment at the end of Aspern was double the size, while the wars reflect a growing size of batteries – the Russians were the first to go really large at Eylau. The standard French tactic from Jemappes through Senarmont at Friedland and MacDonald's formation at Wagram on to Waterloo was to line up a lot of guns with infantry behind to try to blow a hole in the enemy line and then march through. Okay, it was offensive because the French were the ones on the offensive – it does not prove superiority.

I always got the impression that the Russians themselves were never happy with the effectiveness of their artillery. During the Rev & Nap period they kept creating "commissions" to study it and suggest reforms, and they went through three different artillery "systems" during the period, each time trying to get it right.

So, while I don't have any insight into what, precisely, the problem(s) was, there seems to have been a general sense of frustration among Russian officers about it.

Changing an entire branch of the service during wartime can not have been simple, easy, or cheap! Particularly in a country where huge physical distances and climate made production, delivery, and communication difficult. I imagine that even if everybody had agreed on the problems, there would have been a strong lobby for putting-off the fix, given Russia's perpetual budgetary woes.

Effectiveness was more to do with tactical doctrine than any inherant weakness in equipment or training of crew.

The Russinas have always been good at throwing mass rather than quality at a slected point, it was that way in WWII and the Warsaw Pact.

One other factor that hasn't been mentioned –

The Russians had no artillery school. Apparently, all knowledge was gained on the battlefield.

W,

The Russians had no artillery school. Apparently, all knowledge was gained on the battlefield.

Good point – in so as much as it helps to realise the point that having modern guns and excellent ordnance,(apparently) is pretty irrelevant if your artillery officer corps and NCOs' are generally poor, (there are some good first-hand accounts in Paul Britten Austin's 1812 of badly handled Russian artillery), and either inexperienced or badly educated in the military arts and if the artillery arm is mishandled or misunderstood by senior officers.

DB

I've read from respected sources that the Russian artillery arm was not highly regarded in Russia. It tended to get officers who couldn't afford to do anything else, or simply didn't have the aptitude. Powder quality was an issue as stated and although the men were steadfast and brave they lacked the kind of leadership and training other armies enjoyed.

And this is different from which armies? The British artillery service wasn't part of the army, but the ordinance department. It was looked down on by infantry and cavalry officers as middle class and far too like 'trade.' Only men who could not afford to purchase/arrange an officer's commission went into the artillery or engineers. Unlike infantry and cavalry, promotion was strictly by seniority. You find very old captains, with no hope of becoming more than a major or colonel. Most nations outside of France tended to be this way, Austria, Prussia etc.

Despite this, I've hardly ever read of Russian artillery being noticeably devastating in battle.

That is also typical because infantry and cavalry generals are the ones who write the reports. Have you ever heard of the 18 gun/ three brigade artillery charge made by the Royal Horse artillery at Talavera? It was against the flank of the French colums attacking the redoubts. You can find an acount of it in Ayde/Erickson's Pocket Gunner 1811, but not a word was written about it by Wellington or any British officers at the battle. Pretty typical actually. It usually took a spectacular success or failure for the artillery to get any notice. Or the artillerists were French. They did get some ink in battle reports, because there were artillery generals reporting directly to the army, rather than the British version where all artillery battle reports went to the Royal Ordinance Department. The Russian artillery system was also quite isolated from the rest of the army, but they did have artillery Generals.

I always got the impression that the Russians themselves were never happy with the effectiveness of their artillery. During the Rev & Nap period they kept creating "commissions" to study it and suggest reforms, and they went through three different artillery "systems" during the period, each time trying to get it right.

And this is different from other nations? How many commissions did the French form and they went through at least three Systems too from 1792 and 1815, with a lot of minor system changes along the way. The Russians weren't unique in their efforts…at all.

The Russians had no artillery school. Apparently, all knowledge was gained on the battlefield.

Not according to Alexander & Yurii Zhmodikov in their TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS

Like all the European armies, there were a number of transitions and changes within each arm during the twenty years of war.

Bill H.

The Russians had no artillery school. Apparently, all knowledge was gained on the battlefield.

Not exactly. Between 1800 and 1825, some 890 officers joined the artillery from military academies. There were a number of Guard training companies where most of the officers and gunners learned their trade.

As for effectiveness, in 1813 the Prussians praised Russian gunnery and the Allies apparently considered the Russian artillery arm to be the best in 1814.

There's a lot more detail here,including source info at the end:

link

Did anybody read here the postings by Chuvak or un ami – where a lot of excellent information and contrary to the common believe were posted.

Unfortunatley those most competent persons about the Russian Army in General stopped contributing.

I read those, and it seems they did indeed have an artillery school.

All I was getting at was the fact that a typical Russian gun battery size plus the number of guns they had makes for a powerful force on a wargame table – more so than in reality. This made me wonder if 14 Russian guns were as effective as 8 French ones, a doubtful proposition but one worth positing to fund out the right answer.

An informative thread, thanks to all.

All I was getting at was the fact that a typical Russian gun battery size plus the number of guns they had makes for a powerful force on a wargame table – more so than in reality. This made me wonder if 14 Russian guns were as effective as 8 French ones, a doubtful proposition but one worth positing to fund out the right answer.

I think some of this has to do with doctrine on several levels:

1. The Licornes [What four of the twelve or fourteen gun batteries] were often placed at the flanks of a battery, remaining loaded as security. The Licornes were often treated as howitzers or canister machines rather than long-range cannon, six and twelve pounders.

2.The Russians would, like most nations, divide up their batteries into sections, often of six guns. The Artillery Reserve seemed to have been divvied out this way at Borodino. Mikaberidze's book has several examples of this.

3. The artillery was not seen as 'equal' to the other arms. It is not all that abnormal that at Borodino, the General in Charge of the Artillery Reserve was killed leading infantry charges. We still have that view. Even Mikabericze's book shows this. In the deployments, the Artillery Reserve of 216 guns [which took up a lot of space on the battlefield] is not located on even one map, though every other major corps and division of infantry and cavalry are…

4. When you read the French accounts, the Russian guns are commented on, both positively and negatively as often as French guns in Allied reports. They are a powerful force. Eylau, Freidland, Borodino, Bautzen, Lutzen, [where one Russian horse artillery battery stung Ney so much that he changed his axis of his flanking attack.]Leipzig and all of the battles of 1814. Where do we see the Russian artillery less effective than French batteries? How do you measure that? Do we have an equal amount of Russian commentaries as we do French, or English? Not yet, but it's getting there.

5. I've already mentioned the lack of battle report attention artillery generally received.

6. Here is a thought experient: Take a battle situation where 12 Austrian guns were operating, or Prussian or even British. Would you consider 12 Russian guns equal to 12 of any other nation? Why? What was so different about the Russian artillery?

Bill

I think theres an element of too much reading of wargames rules and not enough reading of history.

Some Wargames author puts a biased factor or comment in his rules and suddenly its gospel and the error or prejudice is repeated for decades ever after.

I think the Russian ineffectivenss/lousy powder myth came out with Empire rules. Until then I never heard of anything wrong with Russian guns…… since then it comes up a lot from the former colonies, not so much ( if at all ) from Euro postings.

1815Guy,

I wouldn't be too concerned about the quality of Russian powders, whether it was of worse quality of not probably had no significant impact in battle.

The failings of Russian artillery are quite clearly highlighted in Zhmodikovs accounts (Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars Vols 1 and 2) along with their improvements as the wars progressed.

DB

Bill,

Re:

The Russians had no artillery school

To clarify the reference you refer to states that from 1800-1808 the Russian military educational establishments did not provide any special artillery training.

From 1806 the men of the Guard Artillery did receive a training class. From 1811 this was expanded to include officers.

DB

We can thank the "Empire" rules system for its treatment of Russian artillery and perceived poor quality. If you play that system and believe its ratings you are going to get a very biased opinion against Russian artillery that will stick with you throughout your wargaming life.

Their guns and use were no different to any other nations artillery on the field in its basic form. The problem is its upper level management (doctrinal use) where it was managed. I am of the opinion that when using a Russian army on the table-top your deployment of your batteries must be limited due to the bureaucracy of the leadership. See Borodino for an idea of this.

Limited deployment will bring about the same result as the ill-formed quality issues that people form but with a much more realistic perspective.

DB:
Yep, that's what it says. I was responding to the entire statement:

The Russians had no artillery school. Apparently, all knowledge was gained on the battlefield.

To clarify, here is the entire paragraph on the topic from
Zhmodikovs' first volume, page 62:

The military educational establishments in 1800-1808 did not provide any special artillery training. There was a class in the Guard Artillery, where NCOs of the Guard Artillery could obtain some theoretical education and practicial skills in artillery firing prior to being promoted to the officer's ranks. To be commissioned as an officer of artillery, cadets graduated from the Cadet Corps could select service in the artillery. Artillery NCOs seeking commissions as officers had to pass additional exams in the Artillery Department [later in the Artillery COmmittee]. The artillerymen and firing at wodden boards nine feet [2.75 m] high, placed at a distance of 300-400 sazhen [640-854 m] from the artillery peices. Ammunition for the training was issued at a rate of three rounds per man per year, or about 25-30 rounds per cannon. The training program and command words were standardized in all artillery companies.

So, all knowledge wasn't gained on the battlefield. What constituted 'special artillery training', I don't know. I know what was common schooling in Britain and France. The British artillery officers had to pass an examination, had about the same number of charges to practice with, and any instructions and manual was hand-written by the cadets themselves. In other words, without more detail, it is difficult to determine how different artillery schools were in training and expectations from what Russian officers and men received. I know that most artillery treatises of the day spent at least 2/3 of their ink on fortifications and siege warfare, making powder and the technical aspects of making cannons. [e.g. See Tousard's two volume 1811 work and Ayde's Pocket Artillerist] Artillery schools did too. What benefit this all had on battlefield operations, I don't know.

Bill H.

The Zhmodikovs' do a good job of describing the tactical problems suffered by the Russians between 1800-1805, along with their successes in standardizing equipment and methods.

Russian artillery was generally weak up to 1810 with Count Arakchiev's reforms. Prior to this pre-made cartriges were not standard in the arm, leading to an extremely slow rate of fire. Early mention of 14 gun batteries is found because the artillery at times over saw the 2 gun detachments of battalion guns found in the late 1700's. Generals in the Russian army were not used to working with mobile artillery, since the old system was heavy and the allotment of horses miniscule early on. The reorganization into brigades, with a specified artillery commander was meant is some way to overcome this. As for Borodino, the general in charge of the artillery reserve, a very capable officer, Kutaisev, led a grenadier charge and was killed without anyone noticing it, because he was somewhat outside the chain of command. As only he could order up the reserve artillery, which was actually most of the guns, this meant that the remaining batteries ran out of ammo, and the entire Russian army ended the battle without artillery support. If you check the OBs for most of the rest of the war, you will find a dearth of artillery, and only portions of batteries, again as the Russians used horses for their cavalry ahead of the artillery.

Hi Shane

My original question was based simply on the observation that Russian batteries were twice the size of other people's and they had a similar number of them. So their gun ratio should have been higher, and indeed in a number of battles it was.

Yet we don't see that much in the literature about the terrible effect of Russian artillery. Surprising considering they had guns practically coming out of their bottoms. I was just trying to figure out if that was down to doctrine, non-use, or what. I have found the thread illuminating.

I haven't played Empire myself, I was just extrapolating from organisation charts and OOBs.

I'm moving towards the view that the 1812-14 campaign was a remarkable and in some ways a quite altruistic Russian triumph: they destroyed one huge Napoleonic army, then they destroyed another, then marched to Paris, deposed the source of the problem – and returned to Russia, leaving Europe to realign itself in peace and seeking no territory beyound what they'd taken by early 1813.

Apart from Churchill expending the British empire in '39-45 to be sure of ridding the world of Nazism, I can't think of another comparable act of military altruism.

Starting to like these guys. Apple green gun carriages and all :-P. Lieven's Russia against Napoleon (now out in pb) is a great read.